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Abstract 
Comparative institutional analyses have added much to our understanding of HRM in 
different countries, providing powerful arguments against the need for flexible labour 
markets to boost economic performance. However, existing research has tended to downplay 
the possibility that variation within countries may result in a well-protected core of workers 
that grows ever smaller alongside increasing numbers of precarious workers. We draw on 
data from the World Economic Forum and the European Company Survey to examine how 
institutions influence establishments’ use of temporary workers in 29 European countries plus 
Turkey. We analyse the data using 1) principal components analysis to categorize the 
countries in our analysis, 2) a two-step cluster analysis to draw up groups of establishments 
by their use of temporary workers, and 3) a multilevel logistic regression to examine how the 
institutional setting of establishments and key establishment characteristics interact to 
influence workplaces’ use of temporary workers. We show that institutional characteristics 
shape the prevalence of temporary workers in the 28 European Union member states plus 
FYR Macedonia and Turkey; however, institutions are not deterministic and important 
variation in the use of temporary workers depends upon the interaction between 
establishment characteristics and the establishment’s business system.  
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Introduction 
The comparative institutional literature has demonstrated how institutions shape dominant 
patterns of economic co-ordination, including human resource management (HRM) policies 
and outcomes, within companies in different countries (Dore, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Whitley, 1999, 2007). Such studies have served as cogent reminders that neo-liberal policy 
prescriptions are not always appropriate and do not invariably lead to superior outcomes for 
employees and employers. Indeed, despite increasing levels of internationalization and 
attendant pressures to de-regulate economies, in general, and employment regulations, in 
particular, comparative institutional analysis (CIA) has shown how patterns of economic co-
ordination continue to differ between countries (Hotho, 2014; Psychogios and Wood, 2010; 
Szamosi et al., 2010), supporting the view that contrasting institutional settings lead to 
different kinds of advantages to firms (Allen and Whitely, 2012; Schneider and Paunescu, 
2012). More specifically, CIA analyses have shown how employment legislation can shape 
employers’ investments in particular employee skills (Harcourt and Wood, 2007), how 
institutionalized forms of worker voice can lower employee turnover rates (Croucher et al., 
2012) and collective redundancies (Brewster et al., 2015), and how institutions shape 
organizations’ use of external training providers (Walker et al., 2014).  
However, critiques of the comparative institutionalist literature have highlighted three 
interrelated limitations of the approach. First, existing comparative institutional research on 
HRM often focuses on national-level institutions, leading to uncertainty about which 
particular national-level institutions are ‘present’ within any particular organization (Mellahi 
and Wilkinson, 2004; Psychogios et al., 2014; Wilkinson and Wood, 2012). Second and 
building on the preceding point, the majority of existing comparative studies downplay 
employer variation, potentially creating indeterminate results: even if the majority of 
establishments conform to national ideal types, are those workplaces that do or those that do 
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not resemble the stylized company model the most likely to exhibit the anticipated HRM 
outcomes (Wilkinson and Wood, 2012)? Finally, increasing internationalization means that 
companies may no longer be able to pursue previous employment strategies (Allen and 
Whitley, 2012), resulting in a need to complement existing literature by examining 
employment types that do not conform to ideal types.  
This is a particularly serious gap in the literature, as much of the theoretical 
expectations with CIA relate to how work and employment are likely to vary between 
distinctive institutional regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999, 2007). In particular, 
CIA frameworks would, in general, expect employers in more ‘co-ordinated’ forms of 
capitalism, such as Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, to rely on workers who stay with 
their employer for relatively long periods of time. By contrast, CIA theories would, on the 
whole, expect employers in economies in which the market plays an even greater role in the 
co-ordination of economic activities to be less reliant on lower-level employees; to grant 
workers less voice over how work is organized; and to use the external labour market more 
frequently, both to cover temporary increases or decreases in production and to fill positions 
within the organizational hierarchy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999, 2010). The 
extent to which organizations use employees on a temporary basis is, however, less clear in 
these frameworks, downplaying an issue that is becoming increasingly prominent as a result 
of rising inequality and concerns over the impact of temporary workers on permanent 
positions (Sahadev and Demirbag, 2010;  Voss et al., 2013; Wood and Horwitz, 2015). 
 This paper fills this gap by analysing the use of temporary agency workers within 
workplaces in Europe and Turkey. It will do so by 1) building a typology of European Union 
countries plus FYR Macedonia and Turkey, 2) examining the types of employment practices 
that establishments have in order to generate a typology of HRM strategies and human capital 
resources, and 3) identifying any pattern of establishment type by institutional setting. We 
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draw on data from the World Economic Forum (WEF) to classify countries, and we use 
European Company Survey (ECS) data to examine establishment types. Our samples, 
therefore, go beyond existing accounts of employer variation within countries by 1) 
extending the coverage of countries to the majority of European countries (all of those 
included in the ECS survey), 2) building on existing theoretical work to classify countries not 
previously included in analyses, and 3) incorporating establishment data. We can, therefore, 
undertake a fine-grained analysis of establishments rather than firms or information 
aggregated at the national level and analyse in more detail the varieties of employment 
strategies used by establishments within and across different institutional systems, both key 
requirements to advance comparative institutional analysis (Allen, 2013; Goergen et al., 
2012).  
 
Comparative institutional analyses and temporary workers: propositions 
Whilst several distinctive institutional theories exist within the broader CIA literature (e.g. 
Hall and Soskice, 2001; Streeck, 2009, 2012; Thelen, 2014), the business systems framework 
offers a useful theory that specifies the links between institutions, on the one hand, and the 
types of workers organizations employ and workplace employment practices, on the other 
(Psychogios et al., 2014; Whitley, 1999, 2007, 2010). In addition, the business systems 
framework differentiates between groups of similar countries (Allen, 2014; Cooke et al., 
2011; Psychogios et al., 2014; Whitley, 2009), making it a useful analytical tool to examine 
establishment-level data across a range of countries (Psychogios et al., 2014; Wood et al., 
2011).  
We extend theoretical arguments developed within the business systems framework to 
develop a set of propositions that relate to temporary agency workers. We, therefore, outline 
the business systems framework in this section in order to 1) highlight key areas that will 
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guide the classification of countries in the analysis and 2) draw out expectations about the use 
of temporary workers based on cardinal theoretical arguments. Temporary agency workers, 
whom an intermediary company employs, carry out their work for a different, client 
organization (Arrowsmith, 2009).  
The business systems framework argues that the institutionalized ‘rules of the game’, 
including informal as well as formal ones, both constitute and regulate the types of 
organizations that exist, their priorities as well the dominant modes of interaction between an 
employer and other collective actors, including employees. As a result, institutions shape the 
kinds of workers establishments employ as well as the HRM routines, organizational 
capabilities, and strategies that organizations are likely to be able to implement successfully 
(Whitley 1999, 2007, 2010). The key institutions that underpin these workplace activities are: 
labour-market systems, the state, norms governing trust and authority relationships, and 
financial systems.  
Crucial elements within labour-market systems are the centralization of wage 
bargaining, the forms of employee representation (if any) within workplaces, and 
employment protection legislation (Whitley, 1999, 2007). These factors influence the role 
and organizational careers of workers within companies, the mobility of workers between 
employers (and between sectors), and collaboration between employers and employees 
(Whitley, 1999, 2007), creating important differences between organizations in contrasting 
institutional systems and helping to establish varying business systems models.  
The state can influence employer behaviour in a number of ways by, for instance, 
setting contract law and (not) governing in a predictable and transparent way. In addition, the 
state shapes product, capital and labour markets. Norms and values governing trust in formal 
rules, regulations as well as trust in officials to enforce legislation appropriately shape the 
types of organizations that emerge and their employment strategies (Whitely, 1999, 2007), 
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influencing employers’ willingness to delegate any authority to workers as well as their use 
of certain types of workers (Whitley, 1999: 49).  
Financial systems also influence employers’ employment strategies, and have various 
aspects. The relative importance within economies of capital markets or banks in providing 
funds to companies acts as crucial distinction between institutional settings (Whitley, 1999, 
2007). This dualism in corporate funding is not as distinct in practice as it is in theory (Goyer, 
2011; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006); however, this dichotomy remains a potentially useful 
way to classify countries and employers, especially as the ownership and control of 
organizations has important implications for their ability to enter into long-term, trust-based 
relationships with different types of employee (Whitley, 1999: 49–50; Whitley, 2007).  
It is not just individual institutional elements that contribute to the characteristics of 
business systems; their interdependencies or complementarities do too (Crouch et al., 2005; 
Whitley, 1999). For example, labour-market institutions that grant employee representatives a 
say in strategy decisions or the organization of work within establishments are likely to 
influence establishments’ use of temporary workers. Separately, union involvement in 
collective bargaining may impose conditions on the use of temporary workers (Voss et al., 
2013). Theoretically, the presence of both employee representatives and union involvement 
in wage bargaining may complement one another and create additional pressures to limit 
establishments’ use of temporary workers.  
However, the possible existence of complementarities does not mean that all 
institutions within a country support a coherent logic amongst collective actors; institutional 
systems contain overlooked elements, ‘contradictory’ institutional combinations, and 
previously unknown capabilities (Crouch and Farrell, 2004; Deeg, 2007; Höpner, 2005). 
These diverse institutional elements may be present at the national or sectoral level, and they 
may not be coherent with ideal-typical national-level institutions (Allen, 2013; Höpner, 
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2005). Indeed, institutional changes in one area may lead to that institutional domain 
becoming ‘incoherent’, but remaining ‘compatible’, with the broader institutional system 
(Höpner, 2005). For example, in the area of temporary work, regulatory changes that 
facilitate the use of atypical workers are incoherent with policies that restrict employers’ 
ability to hire and fire employees relatively easily, but may be compatible with the latter 
policies as they may alleviate pressures to liberalize employment conditions for core 
employees.  
Consequently, institutions that restrict employers’ abilities to fire employees and that 
enable employee representatives to have a say in the use of temporary workers may be 
neither sufficient nor necessary to limit the use of temporary workers, as other institutions, 
such as regulations that make the use of atypical workers relatively easy, may provide 
organizations with ways to overcome labour-market ‘rigidities’. This, in turn, suggests that 
the impact of any one national institution will depend upon the precise composition of the 
other institutions that influence particular organizations, leading to variation in the use of 
temporary workers by establishments within the same country or business system (Lane and 
Wood, 2009).  
We now discuss how these institutions shape workplace behaviour by examining 
three key ideal business systems types; namely, fragmented, compartmentalized, and 
collaborative. Unlike collaborative and compartmentalized business systems, fragmented 
business systems develop in environments that are characterized by low levels of trust and by 
unreliable formal institutions (Whitley, 1999: 59), resulting in the rule of law being very 
limited or non-existent. This makes predicting the outcomes of any legal process exceedingly 
difficult and the sharing of commercial risks problematic. This, in turn, will mean that firms 
are likely to be small and rely on their own, limited resources and capabilities to be 
competitive. These capabilities are likely, precisely because of the low-trust and weak legal 
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environment within which employers operate, to be confined to the owner-manager’s 
competencies. The generally low skill levels of employees within opportunistic organizations 
as well as the dearth of opportunities for workers to develop new skills will mean that 
employees carry out a limited range of simple tasks within such workplaces, leading to 
organizations and establishments that are not constrained by employees (Whitley, 1999). 
Although some of the countries in eastern and south eastern Europe, such as Romania 
and Ukraine, come closest to having fragmented business systems (King, 2007), the empirical 
evidence on fragmented business systems is relatively limited (Harcourt and Wood, 2007; 
Psychogios et al., 2014; Wood and Frynas, 2006). As a result, existing research tends to 
downplay the role of wage-setting processes and authority sharing in fragmented business 
systems, even though these are highly important in other business systems (Psychogios et al., 
2014; Szamosi et al., 2010), and assumes that, if the rule of law is generally weak, labour-
market institutions must also be weak. However, the rule of law and workplace authority 
sharing may be orthogonal to one another (Psychogios et al., 2014). For example, whilst the 
rule of law is limited in fragmented business systems, leading employers to negotiate wages 
at the organizational or individual level and delegate little, if any, authority to lower-level 
employees (Cooke et al., 2011; Psychogios and Wood, 2010; Whitley, 1999), social and 
political pressures may lead to some sectoral-level wage bargaining as well as authority 
sharing (Cook, 2010).  
This raises this possibility of two types of fragmented business system: one with more 
‘flexible’ labour markets and another with more ‘rigid’ labour markets. In the former, 
establishments are less likely to use temporary workers than those workplaces in the latter, as 
the latter are likely to see temporary workers as a means 1) to put pressure on permanent 
employees and 2) to overcome labour-market ‘rigidities’. As noted above, organizational 
behaviour is likely to vary amongst employers in the same business system, including 
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fragmented business systems (Psychogios and Wood, 2010); however, in general, and 
building on the preceding discussion, we propose that: 
 
P1: Establishments in fragmented business systems with more ‘flexible’ labour 
markets are less likely to use temporary workers than establishments in fragmented 
business systems with more ‘rigid’ labour markets.  
 
A key feature of compartmentalized business systems, such as the United Kingdom, is the 
presence of large companies under a unified ownership structure that can co-ordinate and 
control activities within production chains and across related sectors that are based on 
common skills, knowledge, and capabilities, and that can offer economies of scope and scale 
(Whitley, 2007: 15–16). Such organizations are largely self-sufficient and, on the whole, 
display little commitment to employees. These crucial features reflect ownership and control 
structures, as such companies are often owned and controlled by disparate groups of 
institutional investors and operate in countries where there are markets for corporate control 
(Gospel and Pendleton, 2003; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006; Whitley, 1999).  
Consequently, this pressure to maintain or increase short-term profitability often 
limits the commitments that senior managers are willing make to lower-level employees 
(Gospel and Pendleton, 2003; Lane, 1989), leading to lower-levels employees who can, if 
necessary, be replaced easily. The generally weak or limited opportunities for employee 
representation in many workplaces in compartmentalized business systems reinforces the 
relatively unimportant role of lower levels employees in making key contributions to 
organizations’ competitive strengths in compartmentalized business systems (Whitley, 1999, 
2007, 2010). In addition, the strong rule of law within compartmentalized business systems 
means that dismissing employees, though relatively easy compared to collaborative business 
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systems, must be done within the legal framework. Consequently, lower-level employees’ 
limited contribution to the organization’s success and the requirement for organizations to 
adhere to legal regulations when dismissing workers are likely to make the use of temporary 
agency workers attractive to employers in compartmentalized business systems.  
It should be noted, though, that compartmentalized business systems afford 
companies room for manoeuvre, resulting in some companies pursuing forms of ‘welfare 
capitalism’ (Jacoby, 1997) and leading to lower-level employees having a higher status. 
Relatedly, employers’ concerns over retaining some workers may force organizations in 
compartmentalized business systems to improve employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Harcourt and Wood, 2007).  In general, however, we 
propose that: 
 
P2: Establishments in compartmentalized business systems are more likely than 
workplaces in business systems with more rigid labour markets to use temporary 
workers. 
 
Collaborative hierarchies develop in collaborative and highly coordinated business systems, 
which are characterized by institutional supports for co-operation between collective 
economic actors. The greater prominence of bank-based corporate funding in collaborative 
business systems enables company owners, unlike institutional investors, to be committed to 
their enterprises, creating the conditions for long-term employment strategies that rely on 
continually up-grading employees’ skills (Whitley, 1999). Consequently, internal labour 
markets will be important and any vacant positions within the organization are likely to be 
filled by existing employees. A corollary of these factors is that collaborative hierarchies will 
be constrained by lower-level employees (Whitley, 1999, 2007, 2010). Labour-market 
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institutions, such as works councils and sectoral collective agreements, will complement this 
outcome (Whitley, 1999, 2007). Building on the preceding discussion, we propose that: 
 
P3: Establishments in collaborative business systems are less likely to use temporary 
workers than establishments in the other types of business system considered here. 
 
 However, the business systems framework tends to focus on core employees within 
collaborative hierarchies, largely downplaying other types of worker and their use by 
establishments (McCann et al., 2008). Indeed, recent labour-market developments have led to 
a bifurcation in the status of those employees on full-time contracts and those on more 
precarious contracts in organizations in some collaborative business systems (Allen and 
Whitley, 2012; Hassel, 2014; cf. Brewster et al., 2007). In these business systems, ‘producer 
coalitions’ of export-focused firms and core-worker representatives may drive a process that 
results in the increased use of temporary agency workers in order to increase productivity and 
enhance competitiveness (Allen and Whitley, 2012; Hassel, 2014). Drawing on these recent 
theoretical and empirical developments, we put forward a proposition that contrasts with P3: 
 
P4: Establishments in collaborative business systems will be more likely than those in 
compartmentalized business systems to use temporary workers in order to overcome 
the institutional constraints associated with permanent employees. 
 
Recently, the business systems literature has highlighted the importance of the 
institutional specificities of workplaces (Allen, 2013; Allen and Whitley, 2012; Lane and 
Wood, 2009), meaning that the particular institutional features of establishments should be 
taken into consideration. For instance, not all workplaces within collaborative business 
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systems will adhere to the ideal-typical establishment model for that system (Allen, 2004; 
Crouch and Farrell, 2004). In other words, not all workplaces in collaborative business 
systems will have employee representatives and a supra-firm level collective wage bargain. 
Conversely, some workplaces in compartmentalized and fragmented business systems with 
flexible labour markets will have employee representatives and adhere to supra-firm 
collective wage bargaining. The presence of these two institutions is likely to influence the 
establishment’s use of temporary agency workers differently depending on the type of 
business system that the establishment is located within (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 
2007). In compartmentalized business systems and flexible business systems with rigid 
labour markets, employers are likely to view the presence of employee representatives and 
supra-firm collective wage bargaining negatively, as they impede employers’ ability to 
exercise authority (Whitley, 2007). As a result, employers are likely to implement policies to 
reduce the power of employee representatives and circumvent collective wage bargains 
where these exist within workplaces. We, therefore, propose that: 
 
P5: Establishments in compartmentalized business systems and fragmented business 
systems with ‘rigid’ labour markets that have employee representatives and adhere to 
a supra-firm collective wage bargain are more likely to use temporary agency workers 
than those establishments in the same business system without both labour-market 
institutions. 
 
Existing evidence suggests that temporary agency work is less common in the public 
sector than it is in the private sector in many European countries, reflecting regulations that 
restrict its use in the public sector (Voss et al., 2013). In general, regulations in business 
systems with more ‘rigid’ labour markets are likely to be more restrictive than those in more 
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‘flexible’ business systems. The influence of these regulations is, therefore, likely to depend 
on the business system within which the establishment is located. Consequently, we propose 
that: 
 
P6: Public-sector establishments in business systems with more ‘rigid’ labour 
markets, including collaborative business systems, are less likely than private-sector 
ones to use temporary agency workers. 
 
Method and results  
We report the methods and results in three stages. The first examines varieties of institutional 
systems within 29 European countries plus Turkey. The second step develops a typology of 
establishment types within these countries. The third step assesses the associations between 
business systems and establishment types. 
Step 1: developing a classification of 30 countries 
Method and sample 
To develop a classification of the majority of European countries (plus Turkey), we perform a 
principal components analysis. One advantage of this technique is that it can analyse Likert-
scale data, such as those in the WEF’s reports. For our sample, we draw on data from the 
WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report 2009, which has been used in related studies 
(Aggarwal and Goodell, 2014; Feldmann, 2008). It is the most comprehensive and extensive 
questionnaire on the business environment in countries around the world and covers 
important institutional factors as well as countries not in other surveys. The survey relies on 
answers from senior executives, who are asked to carry out their assessments using a seven-
point Likert scale. A dual-stratification strategy (size and sector) underpins the sampling 
frames in order to create a representative sample that also includes large organizations 
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(World Economic Forum, 2009). We draw on data for the 30 countries covered in the ECS 
2009. 
We drew on a number of measures to capture institutional diversity amongst these 
countries (Hotho, 2014). These measures reflect theoretical models (Hall and Soskice, 1999; 
Whitley, 1999, 2007). In the initial analysis, we used 12 measures; however, in order to 
overcome problems of multicollinearity (variables with R > 0.8) within the dataset, we 
focused on a reduced number of measures. Excluded variables, such as intellectual property 
rights protection, the transparency of government policy making, and favouritism by 
government officials in decision making, were highly correlated to judicial independence, 
increasing the confidence in the first factor to emerge from the data. We, therefore, used the 
following questions, shown in Table 1, in the analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
(0.737) is well above the threshold point of 0.6 that is used to assess the sampling adequacy 
of the data for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). Bartelett’s test of sphericity was significant (p = 
0.000), indicating the suitability of using principal components analysis (Bartlett, 1954); this 
test is particularly appropriate to use when there are fewer than five cases per variable 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007: 614), as is the case here. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
Results 
The principal component analysis resulted in two uncorrelated components, shown in Table 
2. We label these components ‘rule of law’ and ‘flexible labour markets’; the former captures 
judicial independence as well as the availability of different forms of corporate funding, 
which themselves will depend upon those supplying the finance being able to use relatively 
predictable legal means to protect their investments. The first factor captures a component 
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highlighted by La Porta et al. (1999). The second factor relates to the discretion that 
employers have in determining wage rates and workplace employment levels. Together, these 
two components explain 78 per cent of the variation among the cases. 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
In order to classify each country along these components, we used the Anderson-
Rubin method, producing composite scores for each country that are unbiased and 
standardized (Field, 2005). The factors scores for each country are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
Four types of capitalism emerge from this analysis. A group where the rule of law is 
strong and that has ‘flexible’ labour markets and that conforms closely to the 
‘compartmentalized’ ideal business system type. A second group, in which the rule of law is 
strong and in which labour markets are ‘rigid’, complies most closely with the ‘collaborative’ 
ideal business system type. In a third group, the rule of law is relatively weak and labour 
markets are ‘rigid’; countries in this group conform to the fragmented ideal business system 
type and have rigid labour markets. In the fourth and final group of countries, the rule of law 
is relatively weak and labour markets are ‘flexible’, complying with a fragmented ideal 
typical business system with flexible labour markets. The first, second, and third cluster of 
countries, individually, contain several countries identified in related classifications (Goergen 
et al., 2012; Hotho, 2014). The first cluster contains Turkey that Hotho (2014), whose 
analysis covers only OECD countries and does not examine hiring and firing practices, places 
in a ‘state-organized business system’ group.  Cluster four that mainly covers states in central 
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and eastern Europe includes countries that overlap with a cognate cluster in Holman (2013) 
and with some countries in Hotho (2014), which covers a different range of countries to this 
paper.  
 
Step 2: Developing a taxonomy of establishment types 
Methods and sample 
To create a taxonomy of establishment types, we performed a two-step cluster analysis, using 
five employment strategy measures. The advantages of this method over other cluster 
techniques are threefold. First, it can incorporate categorical variables. Second, it is suitable 
for large data sets (Chiu et al., 2001; Norušis, 2003). Finally, the method does not rely on 
subjective judgements to help form clusters (Holman, 2013). In an initial stage, on the basis 
of maximizing a log-likelihood function, cases are assigned either to an existing cluster or to 
a new cluster. In a subsequent step, a standard agglomerative clustering algorithm groups 
these initial clusters into a number of possible clusters solutions. A Bayesian Inference 
Criterion (BIC) that leads to the most change in distance between the two closest cluster 
determines the optimal solution (or final number of clusters) from this range of possible 
cluster solutions.  
For our sample, we used data from the European Company Survey (ECS) 2009 that 
covers 30 countries: the now 28 EU Member States, plus Turkey and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. (The more recent, 2013 European Company Survey does not, 
unfortunately, pose a specific question about establishments’ use of temporary agency 
workers, so we cannot use it to address our key research questions.) Computer-assisted 
telephone interviews (CATI) were used to collect data on randomly selected workplaces with 
10 or more employees. The survey covered establishments in the private and public sectors, 
but excludes those in agriculture, fishing, and private households. The survey population was 
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3.2 million establishments and the sample was stratified according to size and sector. The 
sample size used in this analysis is 16406.  
We use five measures, shown in Table 4, to capture the type of employment strategies 
within workplaces across the sampled countries. The first measure captures establishments’ 
use of temporary agency workers. The second measure, ‘supra-firm collective wage 
bargaining and employee representation’, draws on two items within the survey, which are 
the level at which collective wage bargaining takes place and the presence of an employee 
representative. Within the ECS 2009 survey, the question on collective wage bargaining 
relates to different forms of group bargaining. As the theories that we draw on highlight the 
importance of wage negotiations at a level ‘above’ the organization, we transform this 
variable to capture only ‘supra-firm’ collective wage negotiations. We also include a measure 
to capture the establishment’s sector (public or private), as regulations that govern the use of 
temporary agency workers often vary by sector in Europe (Voss et al., 2013). 
Larger establishments are more likely than smaller ones to use temporary workers 
(Pedersen et al., 2007); we, therefore, include a measure of organizational size in our analysis 
to capture any influence that establishment size, as measured by the number of employees, 
has on the use of temporary workers. We also include a measure of establishment training, as 
the up-grading of employee skills within a workplace on a regular basis may indicate a desire 
to compete on quality rather than price (Whitley, 2010), leading to a reluctance to use agency 
workers. We include the size and training variables as controls in our analysis. 
Our measures capture significant variation in the employment strategies amongst 
establishments. Other measures in the ECS 2009 survey, such as those that indicate an 
increase, decrease or no change in the workplace’s employment levels and managers’ views 
of employee representatives, can also provide an indication of the type of employment 
objectives pursued within workplaces; however, respondents do not always answer these 
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questions, leading to a significant drop in the sample size. For instance, if these variables 
were included in our analysis, the overall sample size would decrease by more than a third 
and some country samples, such as those for Greece and Portugal, would decrease by 
approximately 90 per cent. Therefore, in order to maintain as large a sample as possible for 
countries collectively and individually, we have not incorporated these variables into our 
analysis.  
 
Table 4 around here 
 
Results  
Four clusters emerge from the two-step cluster analysis. Table 5 provides the characteristics 
of the different clusters. The first cluster contains only establishments that use temporary 
workers. Such establishments range in size, as measured by the total number of employees. It 
should, however, be noted that cluster 1 contains nearly half of the large establishments (500 
or more employees) in the sample. Workplaces in cluster 1 also tend to be in the private 
rather than the public sector. All workplaces in the cluster regularly check the need for further 
training in a systematic way, suggesting that such workplaces cannot be characterized in 
simple terms as ‘bad’ places to work. The workplaces in cluster 1 includes some of those that 
have both a supra-firm collective wage agreement and employee representation as well as 
some of those that have only one or neither of these institutions. Indeed, the ratio of those 
workplaces that have both institutions to those that have only one or neither is higher for this 
cluster than it is for the sample as a whole. 
 
Table 5 around here 
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Workplaces in Cluster 2 do and do not use temporary workers. The ratio of those that 
do not use temporary workers to those that do is approximately three to one within the 
cluster. Establishments in the cluster are more likely to be small or medium sized (fewer than 
250 employees) than large, and are more likely to be in the private sector than the public 
sector. Interestingly, all of the workplaces in cluster 2 do not regularly check the training 
needs of their employees in a systematic way, indicating that such workplaces do not 
emphasize the up-grading of employees’ skills. Workplaces in cluster 2 are also more likely 
to not have a supra-firm collective wage bargain as well as employee representation than they 
are to have these two institutions. The ratio of those establishments that have only one (or 
none) of these two institutions to those that have both is higher for this cluster than it is for 
the sample in general.  
Cluster 3 includes only those workplaces that do not use temporary workers. It covers 
the range of workplaces in terms of size, with no single category being substantively over-
represented. Although establishments in cluster 3 are more likely to be in the private sector 
than they are in the public sector, establishments in the latter sector are substantially over-
represented in this cluster compared to the sample as a whole. All workplaces in cluster 3 
regularly check the training needs of their employees in a systematic way. Cluster 3 contains 
workplaces have both a supra-firm collective wage agreement in place and employee 
representation; there are no establishments that have only one or neither of these institutions. 
Such workplaces, therefore, conform to an important element of ideal typical employers 
within collaborative business systems.  
Cluster 4 contains only those workplaces that do not use temporary workers. 
Workplaces in cluster 4 are, on the whole, small with 50 or fewer employees compared to the 
complete sample. Workplaces in cluster 4 come from the private and public sectors, in a ratio 
roughly equal to that for the sample as a whole. All workplaces in the cluster regularly check 
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the training needs of their employees in a systematic way. All workplaces do not have either 
a supra-firm collective wage bargain or employee representation (or both). The distribution of 
establishments by business system type and cluster is shown in Table 6; it reveals both the 
percentage and the absolute number of workplaces in a specific country and particular cluster. 
 
Table 6 around here 
 
Step 3: The links between institutional systems and establishment types  
In order to assess how the influences of establishment variables on the use of temporary 
agency workers potentially differ between business-system contexts, we perform a multi-
level logistic regression with a random effect to account for intra-business system variation. 
Establishments represent one level in our analysis; business-system type, another. The 
dichotomous dependent variable is the use (or ‘non-use’) of temporary agency workers by 
establishments. The multi-level logistic regression enables us to capture potential 
commonalities across establishments that are located within the same business system, 
reflecting the shared institutional pressures on companies. In other words, establishments 
within the same business system are not statistically independent from one another: they are 
likely to share features as a result of being located within the same business system (Whitley, 
1999, 2010). However, as noted above, we do not expect establishments within the same 
business system to be identical. Incorporating a random effect into our multilevel logistic 
regression enables us to take establishment diversity within any particular variety of 
capitalism into consideration (Gelman and Hill, 2007). We also analyse if key establishment 
characteristics interact with their business-system type to influence the use of temporary 
workers differently in the various business-system types that we identified in step 1 of our 
analysis. 
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Our model, therefore, has the business-system type as the higher level. The lower 
level relates to establishment features. We analyse the influence of organizational size (as 
measured by the number of employees and grouped into five categories), whether the 
establishment is in the public or private sector, the systematic assessment of employees’ 
further-training needs within the establishment, and the presence of both an employee 
representative and supra-firm level wage bargain in the establishment. We also assess 
interactions between the two levels. Of particular interest are the interactions between labour-
market institutions (the presence of both an employee representative and a supra-firm wage 
bargain) and, because of variation in the regulations on the use of temporary workers in 
different sectors, the interaction between the establishment’s sector (public or private) and the 
type of business system in which the establishment operates. The results of our analysis are 
shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
The results of the fixed effects regression indicate that there is, based on the sample 
averages for the individual business systems, no statistically significant difference on the use 
of temporary agency workers for workplaces in different business systems. The business 
system type variable is not statistically significant. This is a surprising result as the business 
systems framework would anticipate statistically significant variation at this level of analysis. 
We, therefore, find no support for propositions 1 to 4 (inclusive) at this level of analysis. 
However, the fixed effects regression does indicate that there are important 
interactions between establishment-level variables and the different business systems types: 
both of the interaction terms in the model are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, 
suggesting that the influence of 1) the presence of employee representatives and collective 
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wage bargains within establishments and 2) the establishment’s sector on the use of 
temporary agency workers depends upon the type of business system that the establishment is 
in. This provides evidence in support of propositions 5 and 6. Below, we examine the fixed 
coefficients for interactions involving particular business systems, enabling us to comment in 
more details on how an establishment’s characteristics and business-system environment 
influence its use of temporary agency workers.  
Other variables, including are control variables, are, as anticipated, statistically 
significantly associated with an increased likelihood that the establishment uses temporary 
workers. For instance, the establishment’s size and sector, and the assessment of employees’ 
training requirements are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level, indicating that 
some workplace characteristics, on average, influence the use of temporary agency workers. 
At this level of analysis, public-sector workplaces are more likely to use temporary workers 
than private-sector ones. 
Table 8 provides the fixed coefficient results for the multilevel logistic regression. 
The results indicate that there are no statistically significant differences for the individual 
establishments’ use of temporary workers across the different business systems. Propositions 
1 to 4 are not supported by these results. Establishments in no one business system are either 
more or less likely to use temporary agency workers than those in any of the other business 
systems.  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Evidence in Table 8 does, however, support propositions 5 and 6. The evidence 
indicates that the use of temporary workers by establishments that have both an employee 
representation and a supra-firm collective wage bargaining depends on the business system 
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within which the workplace is located. Workplaces with these two institutions that are in 
either a compartmentalized or a fragmented business system with rigid labour markets are 
more likely to use temporary agency workers than those establishments with one or neither of 
these institutions. These associations are statistically significant at the one- and five-per-cent 
levels, respectively. This finding suggests that establishments that are located in business 
systems that, in general, provide a great deal of flexibility to organizations do not wish to be 
constrained by permanent workers who may inhibit management’s prerogative either in the 
day-to-day running of the establishment via employee representatives or in wage setting via 
supra-firm collective wage negotiations. By contrast, workplaces in collaborative business 
systems that have these institutions are not statistically significantly different to those 
establishments with one or neither of these institutions in their use of temporary agency 
workers, indicating either that employers in these business systems do not see the presence of 
employee representatives and supra-firm collective wage bargaining as a impediment to their 
decision making or that employers and employees in workplaces with such institutions see 
the use of temporary workers as a way to protect core employees (Höpner, 2005).  
We find that the use of temporary agency workers by public-sector workplaces 
depends on the business system within which the establishment is located. For example, 
public-sector workplaces in compartmentalized business systems are more likely to use 
temporary workers compared to their private-sector counterparts. By contrast, public-sector 
workplaces in collaborative and in fragmented business systems with rigid labour markets are 
less likely to use temporary agency workers than their private-sector counterparts. All of 
these associations are statistically significant at the one-per-cent level. These results indicate 
that establishments’ use of temporary workers depends on the workplace’s sector as well as 
the business system that it is located within.  
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Conclusion 
The paper has addressed the issue of temporary agency work, in many instances a form of 
insecure and contingent employment, and how its prevalence varies across all 28 European 
Union countries plus FYR Macedonia and Turkey. In doing so, we developed a novel 
typology of institutional types for countries to complement existing studies. We also drew on 
a large dataset to establish varieties of employment strategies across workplaces in those 30 
countries. We then examined the links between business systems, establishment 
characteristics, and their interactions, on the one hand, and the use of temporary agency work, 
on the other.  
One of our main findings is that establishments’ use of temporary agency workers is 
not, in general, influenced by the business system within which the workplace operates. We 
found no evidence of statistically significant differences in the use of temporary workers by 
business-system type, reflecting wide variation in establishments’ use of temporary workers 
in different countries but within the same business system type. This indicates that national 
intuitional frameworks should not be seen as coherent and complementary systems, but as a 
mixture of sometimes coherent and sometimes incoherent, but compatible elements that can 
enable the same outcome to be achieved in different ways in contrasting institutional settings 
(Höpner, 2005). Our findings also reinforce the perspective that national-level institutions do 
not determine important firm-level outcomes (Allen, 2013; Crouch and Farrell, 2004), and 
support the view that national institutional influences on establishment outcomes are 
conditional upon the establishment’s specific characteristics and institutional setting. 
Indeed, our examination of how establishment characteristics influence the use of 
temporary agency workers reveals important variations that depend upon the specific 
institutional setting of the workplace. This paper, therefore, contributes significantly to the 
HRM literature by highlighting the salience of the establishment’s specific institutional 
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context within which different policies and practices are implemented. For instance, we found 
that, in compartmentalized business systems, which have flexible labour-market systems, and 
in fragmented business systems with ‘rigid’ labour markets, the presence of both employee 
representatives and a supra-firm level wage bargain is strongly associated with an increased 
use of temporary agency workers. By contrast, these two factors are not statistically 
associated with either higher or lower levels of temporary agency worker use in collaborative 
business systems, indicating that how managers respond to these two institutions depends on 
their broader institutional environment: senior managers in business systems that, in general, 
promote organizational flexibility would appear to view these two institutions negatively, but 
that is not the case for employers in business systems that facilitate greater employer-
employee co-operation. 
Similarly, the links between an establishment’s sector and the use of temporary 
agency workers depends on the workplace’s business system. Public-sector establishments in 
compartmentalized business systems are more likely to use temporary agency workers than 
their private-sector counterparts. By contrast, in collaborative and in fragmented business 
systems with ‘rigid’ labour markets, public-sector workplaces are less likely to use temporary 
agency workers than their private-sector counterparts. This finding has two important 
implications for future HRM research, as it suggests that a workplace’s broader institutional 
context as well as firm institutional specificities interact to influence key outcomes. First, 
future research should take the particular institutional contexts of organizations and 
establishments into consideration when analysing the effects of HRM policies on important 
outcomes. As we have shown, sector-specific regulations in compartmentalized business 
systems may actually encourage the use of temporary agency workers, but limit their use in 
collaborative business systems and fragmented business systems with ‘rigid’ labour markets 
in the public sector. Second, future studies should examine organizations’ employment 
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policies, including employee representation and wage bargaining, in a comparative 
institutional perspective, as the outcome associated with any particular policy can vary 
significantly, depending on the establishment’s institutional context that can differ nationally, 
sectorally and by individual organizations.  
Our analysis relied on data from a number of countries from one year, enabling us to 
reveal important associations between establishment characteristics and institutional settings. 
However, institutional environments are not static (Sahadev and Demirbag, 2010; Whitley, 
2010). Future research could assess how changes in the institutional environment in different 
business systems influence the outcomes associated with HRM practices. For instance, 
institutional environments have changed in several countries as a result of the recent global 
financial and eurozone crises (Psychogios et al., 2014). For instance, Greece’s previously 
‘rigid’ labour market has become more flexible in recent years (Kornelakis and Voskeristian, 
2014), resulting in an economy that adheres more closely to a fragmented business system 
with a flexible labour market than a fragmented business system with a rigid labour market. 
Future research could examine Greece as well as other countries that have undergone 
significant institutional change in recent years to assess the impact of those changes on the 
use of temporary agency workers.   
A change in a country’s business system can have profound implications for the 
prevalence of establishments’ use of temporary workers. Whilst we have found that business 
systems per se are not associated with higher or lower use of temporary workers by 
workplaces, other institutional factors that vary by establishment do interact with the type of 
business system that the organization is located within to influence the use of temporary 
agency workers. Changes in the prevalence of precarious work within different countries 
depend, in other words, on the institutional features of the business systems and the 
institutional specificities of establishments.  
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Table 1 Questions Used in Principal Components Analysis and Relationship to Business 
Systems Framework 
Measure Question and Scale Relevant Concept in Business 
Systems Framework 
Flexibility of 
wage 
determination 
 In your country, how are wages 
generally set? [1 = by a centralized 
bargaining process; 7 = by each 
individual company]  
Union strength 
Judicial 
Independence 
In your country, to what extent is the 
judiciary independent from influences 
of members of government, citizens, 
or firms? [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = 
entirely independent] 
State co-ordination of 
economic activities 
Financing through 
local equity 
market 
 In your country, how easy is it for 
companies to raise money by issuing 
shares on the stock market? [1 = 
extremely difficult; 7 = extremely 
easy] 
Type of financial system 
Ease of access to 
loans 
In your country, how easy is it to 
obtain a bank loan with only a good 
business plan and no collateral? [1 = 
extremely difficult; 7 = extremely easy 
Type of financial system 
Venture capital 
availability 
In your country, how easy is it for 
entrepreneurs with innovative but 
risky projects to find venture capital? 
[1 = extremely difficult; 7 = extremely 
easy] 
Type of financial system 
Hiring and firing 
practices 
In your country, how would you 
characterize the hiring and firing of 
workers? [1 = heavily impeded by 
regulations; 7 = extremely flexible] 
Authority sharing with skilled 
workers 
Source of questions: World Economic Forum (2009); source of business system concepts: 
(Whitley 2000). 
Table 2 Developing a Typology of Countries Principal Component Analysis 
 
 Component 
 1 2 
 ‘Rule of Law’ ‘Flexible Labour Markets’ 
Judicial Independence .937 -.097 
Venture capital availability .835 .273 
Financing through local equity market .829 -.086 
Ease of access to loans .775 .417 
Hiring and firing practices -.023 .896 
Flexibility of wage determination -.591 .623 
Source: World Economic Forum (2009); own calculations. 
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Table 3 Anderson-Rubin Factor Scores for Each Country, Grouped by Type of Capitalism 
 
  ‘Rule of Law’ Factor 
‘Flexible Labour Markets’ 
Factor 
Type of Capitalism and Country 
  ‘Compartmentalized’   
Turkey 0.071 0.862 
Cyprus 0.295 0.133 
Estonia 0.306 1.131 
Luxembourg 0.780 0.102 
UK 1.162 1.383 
Denmark 1.455 2.522 
Finland 1.683 0.243 
‘Collaborative’   
France 0.277 -0.988 
Belgium 0.326 -0.558 
Germany 0.510 -2.043 
Austria 1.039 -0.593 
Ireland 1.046 -0.135 
Netherlands 1.558 -0.548 
Sweden 1.879 -0.477 
‘Fragmented with “Rigid” Labour Markets’ 
Italy -0.926 -2.371 
Greece -0.293 -1.195 
Slovenia -0.216 -0.522 
Spain -0.110 -0.574 
Malta -0.067 -0.224 
Portugal -0.067 -0.897 
‘Fragmented with “Flexible” Labour Markets’ 
FYR Macedonia -1.708 0.084 
Bulgaria -1.284 1.212 
Latvia -1.252 0.496 
Hungary -1.200 0.201 
Romania -1.090 0.419 
Croatia -1.041 0.201 
Slovakia -0.902 1.208 
Czech R. -0.784 0.216 
Poland -0.741 0.428 
Lithuania -0.704 0.288 
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Table 4 Measures Used to Develop a Typology of Establishment Types 
Measure Question Data Type 
Temporary workers Have there been any of the 
following groups working in 
your establishment in the last 
12 months? 
Temporary (agency) workers  
Dichotomous (Yes = 1) 
Supra-firm collective wage 
bargaining and employee 
representation 
Created by combing answers 
from: ‘Is this collective 
agreement negotiated at the 
establishment or company 
level or at a higher level than 
the company?’ and ‘Which of 
the following forms of formal 
employee representation do 
currently exist in your 
establishment?’. 
 
Dichotomous (Yes if supra-
firm level wage bargaining 
and any form of employee 
representation)  
Sector Does this establishment 
belong to the public sector?  
Dichotomous (Yes = 1) 
Establishment size Size of establishment in 5 
categories  
Categorical (10 to 19, 20 to 
49, 50 to 249,  250 to 499, 
and 500 +) 
Training Is the need for further training 
periodically checked in a 
systematic way in your 
establishment? 
Dichotomous (Yes = 1) 
Source: European Company Survey (2009). 
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Table 5 Cluster Distribution in Per Cent and Absolute Numbers by Characteristics 
 
 Cluster  Row total 
 1 2 3 4  Percentage  Absolute 
number 
Cluster Distribution 
Percentage of 
total sample in 
cluster 
27 22 17 34  100  16406 
Use of Temporary Workers? 
Percentage of 
total sample in 
cluster - No 
0 17 17 34  68  11091 
Percentage of 
total sample in 
cluster - Yes 
27 5 0 0  32  5315 
Percentage of 
total sample in 
the category 
       
Size Category 
10 to 19 2.8 7.6 2.8 9.7  22.9  3757 
20 to 49 4.7 6.8 4.3 9.8  25.6  4200 
50 to 249 9.8 5.4 5.9 9.5  30.7  5032 
250 to 499 5.1 1.3 1.8 3.2  11.5  1885 
500 + 4.6 0.9 1.8 2.1  9.3  1532 
Private or public sector? 
Private 21.4 18.0 9.2 25.9  74.5  12226 
Public 5.7 4.0 7.4 8.4  25.5 4180 
Is the need for further training periodically checked in a systematic way in your 
establishment? 
No 0 22 0 0  22  3611 
Yes 27 0 17 34  78  12795 
Supra-Firm Collective Wage Agreement and Employee Representation? 
No, neither or 
just one 
16 16 0 34  66 10898 
Yes, if both 11 6 17 0  34 5508 
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Table 6 Cross-Tabulation of Business Systems Type by Country and by Cluster in 
Percentages  
Type of Business System and Country Cluster 
Temporary Workers? (N, Y, 
Mix) 
  Number 
of 
Cases 
  1 
Y 
2 
Mix 
3 
N 
4 
N 
3 + 4 
N 
  
‘Compartmentalized’       
Turkey 3 21 19 56 75 216 
Cyprus 12 19 16 53 69 217 
Estonia 3 19 10 68 78 62 
Luxembourg 22 33 25 20 45 265 
UK 51 11 5 34 39 522 
Denmark 43 25 17 16 33 771 
Finland 30 25 27 19 46 954 
Unweighted average for business system 23 22 17 38 55  
‘Collaborative’       
France 49 14 17 19 36 1031 
Belgium 49 24 11 16 27 744 
Germany 29 25 24 22 46 1212 
Austria 28 30 13 29 42 765 
Ireland 24 14 19 43 62 377 
Netherlands 42 16 21 21 42 777 
Sweden 34 16 23 27 50 902 
Unweighted average for business system 36 20 18 25 44  
‘Fragmented’ with ‘Rigid’ Labour Markets    
Italy 27 29 15 29 44 1400 
Greece 8 33 4 55 59 829 
Slovenia 18 18 23 41 64 485 
Spain 29 13 25 33 58 1367 
Malta 13 22 11 54 65 83 
Portugal 20 23 5 53 58 573 
Unweighted average for business system 19 23 14 44 58  
‘Fragmented’ with ‘Flexible’ Labour Markets    
FYR Macedonia 5 41 3 51 54 395 
Bulgaria 20 14 16 50 66 125 
Latvia 8 16 16 60 76 156 
Hungary 14 19 11 56 67 260 
Romania 5 33 8 53 61 343 
Croatia 3 36 29 32 61 287 
Slovakia 10 18 13 59 72 213 
Czech R. 21 9 4 66 70 384 
Poland 5 17 18 60 78 598 
Lithuania 9 23 3 66 69 93 
Unweighted average for business system 10 23 12 55 67   
Total 27 22 17 34   16406 
Notes: Row percentages may not total 100 due to rounding errors. 
Source: European Company Survey 2009; own calculations. 
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Table 7 Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression, Fixed Effects 
Source F 
Corrected model 98.614*** 
Business system type 0.390 
Size 951.495*** 
Private or public sector (public = 1) 72.160*** 
Is the need for further training periodically checked in a systematic 
way in your establishment? (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
22.424*** 
Employee representative and supra-firm level bargaining (Yes = 1, 
No = 0) 
0.007 
Employee representative and supra-firm level bargaining*business 
system type 
4.629*** 
public or private sector*business system type 30.315*** 
Notes: The dependent variable is dichotomous response to the question ‘Have there been any 
[temporary agency workers] working in your establishment in the last 12 months?’ 
(Reference category = no); N = 16406; ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at the 1 per-cent 
level. 
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Table 8 Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression, Fixed Coefficients 
Model Term Coefficient Exp(coefficient) 
Intercept -3.371** 0.034 
Compartmentalized business system (reference = 
fragmented with flexible labour markets) 
2.099 8.161 
Collaborative business system (reference = fragmented 
with flexible labour markets) 
1.140 3.128 
Fragmented business system with rigid labour market 
(reference = fragmented with flexible labour markets) 
0.873 2.394 
Size (5 categories) 0.476*** 1.61 
Private or public sector (reference category = public) 0.210** 1.234 
Is the need for further training periodically checked in a 
systematic way in your establishment? (Reference = yes) 
-0.211*** 0.810 
Employee representative and supra-firm level bargaining 
(reference = yes) 
0.083 1.086 
Employee representative and supra-firm level 
bargaining*compartmentalized business system 
(reference = both employee representation and supra-firm 
bargaining) 
-0.436*** 0.646 
Employee representative and supra-firm level 
bargaining*collaborative business system (reference = 
both employee representation and supra-firm bargaining) 
-0.128 0.880 
Employee representative and supra-firm level 
bargaining*fragmented business system with rigid labour 
markets (reference = both employee representation and 
supra -firm bargaining) 
-0.345** 0.708 
private or public sector*compartmentalized business 
system (reference = public) 
-0.365*** 0.694 
private or public sector*collaborative business system 
(reference = public) 
0.752*** 2.122 
private or public sector*fragmented business system with 
rigid labour markets (reference = public) 
0.284** 1.329 
Notes: The dependent variable is dichotomous response to the question ‘Have there been any 
[temporary agency workers] working in your establishment in the last 12 months?’ 
(Reference category = no); ‘***’ denotes statistical significance at the 1 per-cent level; ‘**’, 
at the 5 per-cent level. 
 
 
